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In the late s to early s, agricultural land in Vietnam was allocated rather equitably to farming households. Rather than ownership, each household received use-rights for twenty to fifty years, depending on location and type of crops. However, the state can cancel these rights and take the land for the purpose of "national defense, security, national interests, public interest, and economic development."  From  to , the state took , hectares of agricultural land; by  the total rose to roughly , hectares, affecting some nine million farming people, or about  percent of the country's population.  What proportion of those people objected is unknown but the volume of complaints and protests against land confiscations suggests it has been significant.
In the four years from  through , the Vietnamese government received nearly . million written petitions, accusations, and other complaints from citizens, a twenty-six percent increase over a previous comparable period. Some complaints came from individual families but most were signed by numerous households from the same community. So the . million figure represents at least a few million people. Over  percent of the complaintssome reports say  percent -were about land, especially its confiscation and the low compensation paid to use-rights holders. About  percent of the complaints were resolved, according to the government, leaving over half unsettled for years.  Frequently people unhappy with a resolution or still trying to get one resort to demonstrating. In recent years such public protests have become common in numerous Vietnam's towns and cities. 
Data, Method, and Preview of Findings
The protests under study occurred between  and . My information about them comes from letters and other documents written by peasants; complaints on their behalf filed by lawyers; interviews demonstrators gave to journalists; articles by Vietnamese journalists and other observers; documents and commentary from Vietnamese authorities; and my discussions in late  with protesters in Hà Nội and Văn Giang district, Hưng Yên province. Much of the written materials is available on websites that I have been using for several years.
For each protest studied I noted its location; the kinds of people and names of individuals involved; reasons for people's complaints; objectives of their demonstrations; authorities' actions; involvement of other people and interests; and outcomes. Many protests extended over considerable time; hence I frequently updated my summaries while also adding new cases as they emerged. By early , my computer file had nearly one hundred protests, some with sparse information, and others with much more. Due to limitations in time and other resources, I began to cut back on adding new cases and find more information on ones I already knew about. As a result, I have considerable material on sixty protests.
Helping my analysis has been rightful resistance theory, which Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li developed when they analyzed how and why villagers, workers, and other relatively powerless people complained and protested in China during the s and early s.  I shall elaborate their theory later, but in brief, it says ordinary people with similar grievances in the same locality use legal means to beseech high authorities to make local officials stop mistreating them and do as the law stipulates and the government has promised.
In the sixty cases for which I have adequate information, most correspond to what rightful resistance theory says about how people protest. In this predominant pattern of land-related protests in contemporary Vietnam, people in the same community peacefully demand that national officials make local authorities abide by the law. Some Vietnamese villagers' demonstrations, however, do not fit this pattern and hence do not correspond well to rightful resistance. These I call outliers. As to why people protest, both predominant and outlier Vietnamese cases exceed rightful resistance theory. Vietnamese villagers frequently challenge existing laws pertinent to their grievances and assert rights that go beyond those officially recognized.
The rest of this article elaborates by comparing two protests within the predominant pattern and two outliers, showing their similarities and differences both with each other and with rightful resistance theory. The two within the predominant pattern are fairly representative of protests that have occurred in and around Hồ Chí Minh City and Hà Nội, where much of the unrest over land has occurred. The two outliers, by definition, are unusual in terms of what demonstrators did; in terms of why, however, they are similar to many other cases within and outside the predominant pattern.
Patterns of Land Rights Protests in Vietnam: More than Rightful Resistance

C A S E S I N T H E P R E D O M I N A N T P A T T E R N
In late , Vietnam's Prime Minister approved a request from Hộ Chí Minh City authorities to plan a high-tech industrial zone [khu công nghệ cao] in District Nine, a sparsely populated part of the metropolis.  Authorities expected the zone to attract Vietnamese and foreign research organizations, software enterprises, and electronic companies that would provide good jobs for educated Vietnamese and new income streams for the city.
To construct the zone, authorities needed to reclaim  hectares to which some four thousand households held use-rights. On land ranging from a couple hundred square meters to nearly one-half hectare, each family raised vegetables, pigs, fish, fowl, and fruit trees. When the land confiscation process started in -, many residents objected, individually at first and then collectively.
In February , hundreds of households signed an "appeal for justice," In , residents demonstrated.  In late May, over fifty people, many of them women, marched to the District Nine office in charge of land confiscations. The head official there, they said, had agreed to address their questions about compensation, relocation sites, and other matters. Twice before he had failed to keep his promises to meet them. Upon reaching the office this time, they were told he had gone to an urgent meeting elsewhere. As the residents lingered, unsure about what next to do, they caught sight of the man. As some demonstrators rushed toward him, they and office personnel scuffled until police arrived. That event, other unsuccessful attempts by resident groups to meet with officials, and mounting anxieties about what was happening to their farms and homes contributed to another demonstration in late November. Hoping to get answers to questions they had raised countless times before, they marched to the district offices waving national flags, carrying portraits of Hồ Chí Minh, and hoisting placards summarizing their grievances. Numerous police shadowed them, shouted at them, and grabbed and destroyed some of their placards and pictures. At the office, where more police confronted them, authorities refused to meet them.
District Nine residents based their protests primarily on four claims. One is that the confiscations were illegal. Local authorities were taking land without first making the required development plan and obtaining the Prime Minister's approval for it; they were using the outdated  land law instead of the  land law; and they failed to consult residents, bullied and harassed those who resisted, disrupted demonstrations, and violated democratic procedures in numerous other ways.  The explanation for these shortcomings, many residents said, is corruption, the second reason for their protests. They suspected local authorities were rushing to confiscate land as quickly and cheaply as possible, hold it for a while, then sell it at high prices and pocket the difference.  Third, compensation payments for their land were so small, protesters claimed, that the government was essentially stealing their land. The government's payments, they argued, ranged between only one-fifth and one-twenty-fifth of the land's market value.  Finally, taking land against people's will was unjust [vô công lý], they contended.
All the more unjust was confiscating land from people who had sacrificed greatly for the nation -people like Tư Hảo, a Communist Party member for forty-five years and soldier in the war against the United States; Nguyễn Xuân Ngữ, a vetern who fought for Hồ Chí Minh in the south from  to ; Nguyễn Thị Gái, whose grandparents fought against the French and whose father and two uncles died fighting American forces; and Chín Coi, whose two brothers and a sister died in the war for Vietnam's independence. Chín Coi's mother made her promise never to sell the , square meters that the family farmed because it "holds the blood and bones of our family." Now, said Chín Coi in , some years after her mother's death, the very government to which her family and many others had given so much is seizing that land.  City and district authorities deny not consulting residents and cite instances of meeting with individuals (though not groups). They claim they followed the law in all respects, including compensation payments, which were increased in part because of residents' complaints. Officials also defend the arrests they made of ten residents in early  for disturbing the peace during demonstrations in .  By mid- the arrests, coupled with authorities intensifying their intimidation while increasing compensation payments from , to , đồng per square meter, had undermined opposition. Meanwhile, protesters apparently neither sought nor attracted outside support except for a few bloggers, some Vietnamese journalists, and a lawyer who defended those arrested.  By April , about  percent of the residents had accepted compensation payments and left. To remove the few holdouts, officials used bulldozers and police to destroy homes, fish ponds, gardens, and other property. Construction in the zone then accelerated, although as of May , offices, assembly plants, and other facilities occupied only  of its  hectares.  Far north of Hồ Chí Minh City, villagers on the outskirts of Hà Nội waged a similar struggle to keep their land. In September , the Hà Nội city government instructed authorities in Hoàng Mai district to reclaim fortynine hectares of land for transfer to the Housing and Urban Development Investment Corporation (HUD), which was authorized to create a subdivision around Lake Linh Đàm. Forty-four hectares of the land was in Bằng A and farmed by nearly  households who were to be paid , đồng per square meter plus some relocation expenses.  From the outset, most households objected. By December , however,  households had agreed to leave. One reason is that HUD added , đồng per square meter to the original amount, a direct result of people's opposition. Another reason is intimidation and coercion by city and district authorities. Despite that repression and the increased monetary incentive,  households in December  continued to resist.  Public protests began in  with residents writing to and meeting local officials. Getting no relief, they then approached national authorities. In June , for instance, a petition with over  signatures went to the Prime Minister. The villagers also gave copies of their complaints to journalists, some of whom wrote about the growing controversy. In March , over two hundred households pooled funds to hire an attorney who filed legal claims on their behalf. Meanwhile, the Communist Party members among the protesting villagers sought assistance through their networks in official circles.  Bằng A residents protested on three grounds. One was local authorities' bad behavior. At meetings to discuss the project, officials often prevented objecting residents from speaking. Authorities periodically cut water and electricity to the fields and homes of those who signed letters and petitions, and police detained individuals thought to be leading the protest. Such actions, peasants told journalists, "are undemocratic" [không dân chủ]. One Communist Party member, recently retired from the Ministry of Education, said local authorities "don't respect democratic rights" [không tôn trọng quyền dân chủ]. He and nine other local party members were "disciplined" [kỷ luật] by higher party officials because their families were among those refusing to leave.  Villagers also objected to the low payment for their land. Even with the additional amount, the compensation would be only , đồng per square meter, which Bằng A peasants described as "paltry" [mức bèo bọt]. It was but a smidgen of the millions of đồng each square meter was worth to HUD. Villagers knew the local real estate market and wanted to negotiate directly with the developers. But authorities forbade that, which was one reason -along with suspected corruption -why protesters said officials were "excessively solicitous and cozy with the investors."  Villagers also argued the compensation equaled but a few years' worth of their earnings from the vegetables and herbs they produced on the land. For instance, the household of Trần Thị Quý typically earned , đồng per day selling produce from  square meters. Compensation for that land would be  million đồng; divided by , that equals  days, less than three years of the family's daily earnings. Without land, Trần Thị Quý asked, "How are we going to live? We don't have other work. If they want to take our land for business purposes, they have to come to terms with us."  This woman's remarks pertain to a third basis for protest. Farming was most households' primary source of livelihood. Twice before, the city government had taken some of their fields and paid them much less for it. Now it was even worse despite the larger compensation, because the city would take everything. "Where are we, some thousands of workers, to go?" asked Lưu Thị Sơn rhetorically. "We'll just be standing on the street. How will we eat; how will we live?"  "We live or die because of the land," stated one of the protesters' petitions. "How are we to live if the state takes all the land without proper compensation to us? We . . . demand justice."  In late December , authorities warned that they would forcibly take the land of Bằng A peasants who had not agreed to leave by January , .
Those holdouts would also be deprived of the additional , đồng per square meter compensation. Early morning, January , authorities accompanied bulldozers that razed the fields of over  households who still resisted. Prior to the machinery entering the contested fields, soldiers with mine detectors searched for explosive booby traps.  They found none. 
E X P L A I N I N G T H E P R E D O M I N A N T P A T T E R N
The protests by District Nine and Bằng A villagers and by people camped in Hà Nội's Mai Xuân Thưởng park illustrate a pattern for most of the land protests I have studied, and how they protest is part of the pattern. People in the same village or neighborhood collectively complain to local authorities. Getting no relief, they continue to protest, sometimes for years, by sending letters, petitions, and other documents to higher levels, especially to national offices and leaders. Often a group designates a few members to travel to higher authorities' offices; frequently individuals in Mai Xuân Thưởng park, for instance, represent dozens of others in their home villages. Public demonstrations are peaceful, often little more than people quietly sitting and standing while holding signs, photos, and patriotic symbols.  Protesters regularly contact Vietnamese news media; in recent years they have also reached out to foreign media, the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and other international entities. Many now arrange for their materials to be posted online. Sometimes they ask lawyers to help them file complaints.
Journalists and occasionally lawyers are nearly the only outsiders whose assistance they seek or attract, and protesters in one locality do not coordinate their actions with their counterparts elsewhere.
Influencing how villagers protest are their perceptions of Vietnam's political system.  To many demonstrators, the main cause of their land problems is local officials who violate national laws and programs. Consequently, people in one place have little incentive to coordinate with people elsewhere because their problems are different due to the local authorities being different. Residents of each place go to national authorities not because that is where the problem is but to pressure top officials to make local ones behave.
Another reason for separate rather than collective protests is that collaboration would likely exceed what authorities will countenance.  The extensive surveilance infrastructure of the state impedes whatever inclinations villagers in one place might have to coordinate their actions with counterparts elsewhere. The single authorized organization claiming to represent villagers' interests, the Peasants Association [Hội Nông Dân], rarely helps, and indeed often hinders public protest. Even demonstrations by people from the same place can be risky because officials might deem them to have crossed a hazy line between what is legal and illegal. This is a major reason demonstrators are usually peaceful, silent, and prominently display Vietnamese flags and Hồ Chí Minh portraits. Surveillance and legal uncertainties also inhibit outsiders such as professors, students, non-government organizations, and even lawyers, from aiding, advising, or joining villagers' protests.
A second part to the predominant pattern is what villagers publicly seek
and on what grounds. Their overall demand is justice and fairness. The fundamental basis for this claim is having the means to make a decent living.  Protesters often demand to retain the land so that they can support their families. Some agree to leave but only for a compensation that is fair, for which they have a couple of measures. One is to provide as well for their families in the future as they can now from farming. A second is what the land will be used for if they leave. Villagers in Bằng A and many other places said they would surrender their land for less compensation if the state needed it for the good of the country.  But if, as is frequently the situation, the land is for the benefit of a company, investors, home buyers, etc., then the compensation should be at least what the land is worth in the real estate market plus, protesters often add, assistance with relocation and finding decent employment. To determine an acceptable compensation, villagers typically want to negotiate with those who will get the land and object to government authorities imposing an amount. They suspect that authorities, after paying them a small amount, will later sell the land for considerably more and keep much of the difference or personally benefit in some other way. This, plus harsh, even violent actions by authorities prompts protesting villagers to rest part of their grievances on officials' undemocratic behavior.
Rarely, however, do protesters publicly condemn the political system.  On the contrary, they typically affirm their allegiance to the state and the Communist Party.
This pattern has similarities to public protests over land in the late s and early s when collectivized agriculture was being replaced by household farming.  Like now, those villagers went above local officials to petition higher authorities, a method that Vietnamese peasants have used since at least the nineteenth century. Besides believing local authorities were inattentive or unfair, they often judged them to be corrupt. Also like now, journalists then often published articles about the controversies.
At that time news reports were nearly the only means peasants had to broadcast their situation; the internet and even access to photocopy machines were still years away.
One striking difference between then and now is what villagers protested about. Most of the public disputes then involved villagers in the south trying to retrieve fields that had, in their view, been illicitly taken from them during land redistributions prior to and after . Other protests, primarily in the Red River delta, were composed of peasants demanding that fields allocated to neighboring villages years earlier by local authorities be returned to their village. A second major difference is that numerous late s-to-early s protests became violent; rival claimants physically fought and sometimes killed each other and burned down houses; neighboring villagers attacked, even murdered each other and authorities who were trying to resolve the disputes.  The predominant pattern for how Vietnamese today protest about land issues resonates with rightful resistance theory.  In rightful resistance, clusters of relatively powerless people living in the same vicinity use non-violent methods in approved channels to press their claims locally and then entreat higher officials to help. They also seek support from non-governmental institutions and people, such as journalists, lawyers, and civic organizations.
Their protests can stretch over considerable time until they get relief, are forced to give up, or are exhausted. However, what is sought and why only partly corresponds to rightful resistance theory. According to this theory, resisters press more powerful authorities to stop local officials from mistreating citizens, violating laws and regulations, and being corrupt while affirming their loyalty to the political system and disavowing anti-government sentiments or goals. Indeed they base their claims on existing laws, rules, and regulations and the commitments and promises authorities have made. Villagers in District Nine, Bằng A, the Mai Xuân Thưởng park, and most cases for which I have evidence do link their land claims to officials' pronouncements about the political system being democratic and of, by, and for the people. They frequently accuse local authorities of being abusive and unresponsive to their complaints, ignoring the people they are supposed to serve, and thus being undemocratic. Villagers also argue that authorities'
actions contravene laws and regulations about land confiscations, compensation, and other matters. Vietnamese protesters' demand for fairness and justice, however, goes beyond applying existing laws, regulations, and official promises, and hence exceeds rightful resistance theory.  One additional claim about justice and fairness is that it is wrong to take land against the will of families who served and died for their country and the very government now mistreating them. Such disregard for people's sacrifices is vulgar and immoral. Another claim is that summarily confiscating land greatly favors those who end up getting it at the expense of those currently using it. Even minimal justice requires an equitable outcome for all concerned. This demand has something of a moral economy ring to it. But unlike moral economy claims, these Vietnamese peasants are not just insisting on subsistence; they want, were they to give up their land, at least the same standard of living they have as farming households. Also unlike moral economy claims, the protesters are not harking back to pre-market obligations of institutions and wealthier people. Indeed, by insisting on negotiations between themselves and a would-be buyer, they invoke the market as a mechanism for determining fair compensation.
Also beyond rightful resistance theory, these two additional claims about justice and fairness reject laws authorizing the state to unilaterally reclaim farmland. The demand to negotiate a price includes the possibility that a potential seller can ultimately decide not to sell, another stance at odds with national laws. Indeed, according to these claims, a family is entitled to refuse to sell regardless of price, not only because it holds use-rights but because it needs the land for its livelihood, or it simply prefers to farm, or its family shed blood for the country in order to have land on which to make a living.
O U T L I E R S : U N U S U A L P R O T E S T S
A few protests in contemporary Vietnam lie outside the predominant pattern in terms of how they are conducted. The first of two examples occurred in Hồ Chí Minh City in . Consisted with both the predominant pattern and rightful resistance theory, protesters there appealed to higher authorities to correct local officials' wrongs. But unlike the predominant pattern and rightful resistance theory, villagers from many different places collaborated.
Moreover, demonstrators in Hồ Chí Minh City overlapped with those in Hà
Nội, bringing Vietnam the closest it had been in decades to having a national protest movement.
Land was the central issue for the Hồ Chí Minh City protests.  Some people were demanding the return of land taken from them two decades earlier. Their struggles were carryovers from contentious land claims in the s. The more prevalent demand was to stop taking land for development projects at the expense of people's livelihoods. As one demonstrator from An Giang province explained to a BBC reporter, "On land hangs my existence. Losing the land, I must object. The Bình Long industrial zone [being built in
An Giang] stipulated a price which we refused. District and provincial authorities then used force, demolished all our possessions, and even removed our ancestors' graves."  During the demonstrations people also made additional demands: police must stop harassing protesters, stop intimidating people who give them food or other support, and release the protesters they had arrested. After authorities prevented them from using bathrooms in the government buildings near where they had congregated, protesters added that to their complaints.  The Hồ Chí Minh City protests in  peaked in June and July. For twenty-seven days, hundreds and sometimes over a thousand villagers from the Mekong delta and rural areas of the city camped outside the southern office buildings of the National Assembly and the central government. They pleaded for national authorities -particularly National Assembly delegates, the Prime Minister, and the President, all of whom were meeting in the city or rumored to be arriving -to resolve their claims. Enduring hunger, hot weather, rain, and weariness, they stood, sat, and slept on sidewalks; they made banners and posters; and they painted slogans and key demands on white t-shirts, which they wore, gave away, and sold to passers-by. Dozens at a time marched in the streets, carrying their banners, Vietnamese flags, and portraits of Hồ Chí Minh to TV stations and newspaper offices and through downtown and residential areas.  Whenever possible, they talked to journalists, most of who were from foreign news agencies. Few Vietnamese media outlets would cover the demonstrations, because officials frequently intimidated journalists and others showing interest in the protests. On at least one occasion, the protesters themselves rescued local journalists from club-wielding police.  Most demonstrators were women, many of them rather elderly; several of the younger ones had children with them. Most spokespersons were women; and most of the people who gave protesters food, water, shelter, and money were women.
By late June and early July, concerned citizens, including Buddhist monks, were giving food and other assistance. Joining the demonstrations were a few people in the emerging pro-democracy movement, notably Khối
[Bloc]  members, who, along with several ad-hoc groups, also assisted foreign journalists and uploaded to websites interviews, documents, and news reports regarding the protests. 
The nearly four weeks of protests involved a degree of organization. One aspect was communication and coordination among villagers in different places who knew each other from previous demonstrations.  Periodically since the late s, people from communities in southern Vietnam have protested in the city, typically outside prominent government offices and in public parks. When separate groups happened to converge at the same site, they swapped stories and formed friendships. One of the earliest occasions occurred in  when a few hundred villagers from the Mekong delta protested for weeks outside government offices. Because their complaints, usually about land, were not satisfactorily addressed, several groups repeatedly demonstrated in their home districts, in Hồ Chí Minh City, and even in Hà Nội where they met peasant demonstrators from northern provinces.
Individuals in the various groups kept in touch, often through cell phone calling and texting. One person in this network was Lư Thị Thu Duyên, whose grandfather gave thirty-five years to Vietnam's revolution. She and her sister, protesting the confiscation of their family's land in Gò Vấp district, were among those demonstrators in . Networks like hers spread news in late June  that victims of road and industrial zone construction projects in Tiền Giang province were protesting outside the National Assembly's building in Hồ Chí Minh City. By July , , groups from ten provinces and four city districts had joined them. In mid-, Lư Thị Thu Duyên emerged as one of the demonstrators' spokespersons.  Other aspects of an organization evolved as the demonstrations continued.  Participants from different localities took turns marching the streets and performing tasks such as distributing food and water. The demonstrators selected representatives to speak to journalists and government officials. Often those representatives were in the compounds of the government buildings while most demonstrators remained outside. Each group had a system for rotating participants; while several villagers carried on the protest, others returned to their homes to rest, recover, and collect money, food, and other resources to carry back to the demonstration sites.
While protests persisted in Hồ Chí Minh City, episodic peasant demonstrations in distant Hà Nội became more frequent. And in early July, dozens of villagers from Bình Thuận province who had been in the Hồ Chí Minh City demonstrations joined groups of northern villagers at Hà Nội's Mai Xuân Thưởng park. Now the two cities' protests were linked. Participants in both communicated by phone, texting, and e-mail. By July , about two hundred people from five southern provinces were demonstrating with hundreds of northern villagers at government buildings in Hà Nội. Among the southerners were several elderly women declaring that even though their husbands and sons had died fighting for Vietnam's reunification, local officials recently stole their land. 
In the few occasions that officials met with protesters' representatives, they urged everyone to return to their home districts. Local authorities, they said, had been ordered to solve all complaints. Few villagers swallowed this; having done just that several times before with no results, explained spokeswoman Cao Quế Hoa, "we don't believe it now."  As protests in Hồ Chí Minh City persisted and enlarged, authorities became more repressive. By the second week, police had detained several demonstrators and forcibly transported many others to their home villages.
Some of those participants later eluded police to rejoin the demonstrations. By the fourth week, when protesters from nineteen provinces numbered , in Hồ Chí Minh City, police from around the country augmented that city's force. On the night of July , in front of hundreds of onlookers, waves of police swept over the demonstrators. Initially, the police used words to persuade many to leave the city. But by  p.m., they used tear gas and batons, forcing remaining protesters into buses that took them home. Several people were injured; some were detained.  Demonstrations, however, did not cease. For the rest of the year, numerous groups of villagers traveled to Hồ Chí Minh City to protest at government buildings about land confiscations, corruption, and other injustices. But these demonstrations fit the predominant pattern. Authorities' actions stifled a repeat of the concentration of protests that had occurred in mid-. The second case outside that predominant pattern is the lengthy struggle since  by villagers in Văn Giang district, Hưng Yên province, about twenty kilometers southeast of central Hà Nội. Three differences from the predominant pattern are that Văn Giang protesters have considerable support from outsiders, they have occasionally become violent, and they have endorsed land protests elsewhere. The latter two of these also separate the Văn Giang case from rightful resistance theory. Also unlike rightful resistance theory, but similar to many other Vietnamese land protests, some of what Văn Giang villagers seek goes beyond existing laws and state promises.
In  and , the Prime Minister's office approved requests from Hưng Yên and Văn Giang officials to build a highway and a residential area called Ecopark. Chosen to do both projects was the newly formed Việt Hưng Urban Development and Investment Company (UDIC). The plan is that Ecopark, the largest urbanization project in northern Vietnam at an expected cost of over eight billion US dollars, will include townhouses, condominium towers, a commercial center, parks, a hospital, and a university. Some of the other actions involved violence. In January  and April , a few hundred Văn Giang villagers fought with shovels, picks, hoes, bricks, and stones against hundreds of armed, club-wielding, tear gas canister-throwing police that guarded heavy equipment operators who were destroying peasants' fields and reclaiming several hectares for Ecopark.
Although they were no match for the violence used against them, villagers resorted to force when police waded through the lines of demonstrators.
Bludgeoned protesters included mothers of war martyrs [bà mẹ Việt Nam anh hùng] who had pleaded with police to turn back.  Văn Giang villagers' demands resonate with those of many other Vietnamese land protesters. If they must surrender fields, they want to negotiate a fair price, not accept the government-and investor-stipulated compensation because that amount, even after being raised to , đồng per square meter, is far below the land's value, villagers say. Farming households typically net that much each year, and frequently, because of ornamental plants and trees they grow, twice or thrice that amount. Moreover, the advertised price for Ecopark's least expensive residence is  times that compensation.
Even after deducting construction costs, an extremely handsome profit will remain for UDIC and its partners. Essentially, conclude many villagers, authorities and investors are stealing their land.  Second, numerous villagers do not want to sell. "It's the land -the farming -people want, not money," they say. "Land is our body and blood," one explained. Put differently, says another, "Farming is our livelihood and that of our children."
People who want to farm, villagers insist, are entitled to do so. Furthermore, without land, many can't support themselves; no land means no viable livelihood.  Third, villagers demand that authorities be democratic. They object to local officials preventing them from speaking at meetings; they denounce authorities and UDIC for using force and threats against residents; and they insist on transparent decision making involving their land and homes.  Giang villagers signed a statement deeming Đoàn Văn Vươn a "hero . . . in the struggle to protect peasants' basic rights." During the April  trial of the two men and others, a delegation from Văn Giang traveled to Hải Phòng, joining hundreds of other villagers as well as many political reform advocates to express solidarity with the accused.  Some Văn Giang villagers have also participated in protests in Hà Nội against Chinese incursions into Vietnamese territory.  Văn Giang villagers' protests have delayed, but not halted, Ecopark construction work. Their persistent opposition has also forced authorities to increase the compensation from , đồng per square meter to ,.
Partly for this reason, more villagers have abandoned the struggle. By April , according to district authorities,  percent of households had accepted payment to surrender their fields.  Protesters' representatives, however, claim the figure is  percent and a major reason for it being that much is intense intimidation and coercion by local authorities and UDIC.  The project has divided the community, pitting accepters against protesters. Even the local Communist Party organization has split and ejected dozens of members who opposed the project. Several subdistrict officials have quit because they detested Ecopark or grew weary of being wedged between advocates and opponents.  In December , two village officials siding with the protesters were sentenced to one-year imprisonment for disturbing the peace. Shortly after their trial, a person thought to be hired by Ecopark threw acid on their attorney, burning his neck and chest. 
E X P L A I N I N G A U T H O R I T I E S ' A C T I O N S
Land protesters take their complaints to national offices expecting favorable reactions there.  To an extent, their expectations are realized. Since , the central government has sent several problem-solving teams to places that generate persistent petitions and demonstrations against confiscations of fields and house lots, low compensation, and other land issues. Meeting with villagers, local officials, and investors, these national, sometimes provincial teams have resolved many contentious cases. They often find merit in villagers' claims.  Several national agencies have found merit as well. In July , shortly after the lengthy demonstrations in Hồ Chí Minh City had been dispersed, the Minister for Natural Resources and Environment said studies show that  percent of complaints regarding land are at least partly correct. Villagers seeking more compensation, he added, are not being greedy. They mainly want fairness, and what greatly upsets them is being forced to surrender their land at low prices for the benefit of business interests. In , the Government Inspectorate reported that nearly half of all citizen complaints ( percent of them concerning land confiscations) between  and  were entirely or partly valid.  Due in part to people's criticisms and demonstrations, national authorities have revised land laws and regulations regarding land confiscation, compensation, and assistance to affected people.  In , the National Assembly, partly in response to public pressure, began drafting a new land law. Broadly speaking, the legal and administrative changes thus far have provided more opportunity for compensation to approach market values and to be determined by negotiations between land-use holders and developers. By , such negotiated settlements were becoming more common in and around Hồ Chí Minh City, although not elsewhere.  Another consequence of land protests, probably unintended, has been to widen the arena for public discourse and criticism in Vietnam.  Beginning with Thái Bình villagers' demonstrations against corruption in -, peasant protests have been pushing officials to tolerate public discontent.
Unimaginable in the s and early s, peasant demonstrations since then have helped make way for workers, market vendors, urban residents, and others to publicly air their grievances as well. Officials' tolerance is not boundless, but it is far greater now than before. But there have also been unfavorable responses to land protesters, such as violently evicting families from their fields and homes, dispersing demonstrators, and arresting them. Also, national authorities have yet to devise an effective method for resolving persistent disputes.  They typically refer such cases to provincial and district authorities, the same officials that caused villagers to appeal to national authorities in the first place. Indeed, national authorities themselves frequently say that lower-level officials fail to take villagers' complaints seriously, do not follow the law, and abuse their power.  Laws and regulations make provincial and district authorities the state agents responsible for reclaiming land and compensating people. Because the rules and regulations governing these actions are complicated, evolving, and often contradictory, provincial and district authorities are frequently illinformed and confused.  At the same time, many officials are eager to attract investors with projects that will diversify local economies, and a key to getting such investment is low-cost land. This helps explain why many local authorities, instead of aiding discontented villagers and thereby avoiding protests, minimize compensation payments and ignore or dismiss villagers' demands.  Other considerations, too, motivate officials' behavior. Land acquired from current users at a low price can be sold to investors at a higher price.
The difference may augment local government revenues so as to improve public services like health care and education, and some of it can be stolen by officials. When investors' managers deal directly with villagers, they too strive to keep compensation low in order to reduce costs. Often district and provincial officials expect payments from those managers. That money might be for community improvements but some might go to the authorities themselves, one of many common forms of corruption. Indeed, the numerous opportunities for authorities to benefit personally from land confiscation and compensation arrangements often helps to explain why they shun villagers' claims.
Conclusion
Why villagers protest and the grounds they have for doing so are similar across the two pattern types examined in this article: those to which most land protests in recent years conform and those outside it. Villagers typically claim local officials are violating laws and regulations, abuse their authority at villagers' expense, and are corrupt. Villagers frequently characterize these actions as violations of democratic procedures because authorities fail to consult with residents, fail to take people's views and concerns seriously, and fail to be transparent about programs and policies affecting the community. Instead, officials hide information, make major decisions without community input or knowledge, and often resort to intimidation and force when people refuse to do their bidding.
These reasons and grounds for protest correspond to rightful resistance theory. But Vietnamese protesters' arguments go further. Besides upholding certain laws, they also reject ones authorizing the state to unilaterally claim their farmland. They champion an entitlement, regardless of law, to refuse to surrender their land-use rights. They base this stance on notions of fairness and justice that go beyond the law or even officials' promises. One such notion is that it is unjust to take land against the will of families who have served the Vietnamese nation. Another is that confiscating land against a family's will unfairly harms that family and benefits those who get the land.
How Vietnamese villagers protest conforms in most cases to rightful resistance theory. People living in the same village or neighborhood appeal to higher authorities to intervene on their behalf and compel local authorities to do the right thing, demonstrate publicly and nonviolently, and seek help from journalists and lawyers. In carrying out their own protest, they do 
A B S T R A C T
From  through , the Vietnamese government received nearly . million complaints from citizens, mostly about land confiscations and related issues. Frequently people angry over land issues have resorted to public demonstrations. This article compares protests in Vietnam to rightful resistance theory. A predominant pattern for how Vietnamese villagers protest corresponds to that theory. Some Vietnamese demonstrations, however, do not fit that pattern; they are outliers. In terms of why people publicly demonstrate, Vietnamese protests in both the predominant pattern and the outliers are similar to each other but exceed rightful resistance theory by challenge existing laws and asserting rights not officially recognized. 
